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Abstract 
This paper analyses the violent conflict between Malay-Muslim separatists 
and Thai security forces between 1959 and 2008 by examining 
contemporary developments of the Malay-Muslim separatist movement and 
corresponding government policies aimed at suppressing Malay resistance.  
The detailed analysis of violent resistance and counter-resistance strategies 
proves that political opportunities and constraints have a significant effect on 
violent resistance.  This article argues that phases of ―hard‖ policy on the 
south have the opposite intended effect, i.e. a mobilizing effect, on violent 
resistance, despite the relative openness of the Thai political system and 
political participation of Malay-Muslims in that system.  Violence has 
decreased only when resistance groups have conscientiously changed 
strategies and/or resources have been limited, particularly during phases of 
―soft‖ government policy.  Implications of these findings and suggestions for 
future research are discussed. 
 
 
Introduction 
For well over fifty years, Thailand‘s southernmost region has been the site of 
an armed separatist conflict perpetuated by members of the Malay-Muslim 
minority.  Over the past decade in particular, this conflict has resulted in a severe 
humanitarian crisis, the declaration of martial law in the region, the suspension of 
civil rights for Malay-Muslims, and human rights abuses as documented by 
international watchdog groups.
1
  In addition, the Thai government‘s handling of 
this crisis has increased international political tensions between Thailand and 
many Muslim-majority states, both in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, 
which claim that Malay-Muslims suffer from discriminatory state policies, 
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 For example, see Human Rights Watch 2007 for a comprehensive analysis of human rights 
abuses on both sides. 
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cultural repression and police/military brutality.  Since 2004, well over 3,500 
combatants and civilians have been killed, and there continues to be a security 
presence of approximately 40,000 Thai army soldiers and policemen occupying 
the southernmost region.  Because of the recent developments in Thai politics 
beginning in 2006, including massive protests against the government in 
Bangkok
2
 and the constant turnover of elected officials, political efforts — at 
least, public efforts — to address the conflict and work towards a peaceful 
resolution have been almost nonexistent. 
While there has been some focus in existing literature on the historical, 
economic, and political contexts of this conflict, there is a notable paucity of 
social science scholarship analyzing Malay-Muslim separatism as a social 
movement, particularly regarding the roles that political opportunities have 
played in the ever-evolving dynamics of resistance.
3
  Therefore, this article will 
analyze the relationship between political opportunities (and conversely, political 
constraints) and the timing, form, and outcomes of Malay-Muslim resistance.  As 
social movement theorist Mayer Zald contends, ―we need to recognize both the 
conditions under which movements generally rise and decline, and the ways in 
which movements maximize their influence within a given context.‖4  Therefore, 
in exploring the relationship between government policy and movement activity, 
this paper aims to specify the role of political opportunities and constraints on 
resistance action.   
It has been emphasized in the literature that analyses need to move beyond 
―root causes‖ of the Malay-Muslim conflict.5  While it is certainly preferable to 
avoid reiterating laundry lists of grievances or historical events that have been 
explored elsewhere, it is also important to note that the analysis of root causes is 
far from complete.  Because Malay-Muslims have been marginalized in the 
literature on Thailand, many sources detailing key events and developments of 
Malay-Muslim resistance disagree on important facts, such as when resistance 
groups where formed and by whom, which groups are still active, and whether or 
not certain groups engage in violent activity.  Another reason to avoid 
assumptions about root causes regards policy implications.  For example, when 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra (2001-06) identified poverty as the root 
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 For more information on the protests in Bangkok by the People‘s Alliance for Democracy, see 
BBC News 2 December 2008. 
3
 Zald 1996, 283, defines a social movement as a ―sustained and self-conscious challenge to 
authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors (organizations and advocacy networks), some 
of whom employ extra-institutional means of influence,‖ and it is under this definition that the 
Malay-Muslim resistance movement may be categorized as a social movement. 
4
 Zald 1996, 277. 
5
 Jitpriomsri and Sobhonvasu 2006. 
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cause of Malay-Muslim resistance, the government began to fund new projects 
aimed at increasing economic opportunities and financing in the region.
6
  
However, the prioritization of an economic root cause over all others had little to 
no overt effect on the high level of violence that resistance groups managed to 
sustain during this period; in addition, this economic development possibly 
aggravated southern tensions vis-à-vis the expansion of Thai infrastructure and 
financial influence within Malay territory.
7
  This example highlights the need to 
look at policy responses, particularly how ―hard‖ policies (including the 
implementation of a military ―solution‖), ―soft‖ policies (including offers of 
amnesty, negotiations, and the establishment of mediating structures
8
) or a 
combination of the two have affected violent resistance.   
This research relies on primary and secondary sources, particularly news 
articles from Thai and other media outlets, reports by international human rights 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, 
and secondary historical, political and sociological analyses.  Attempts to locate 
data on casualties, troop levels and other pertinent statistical information in Thai 
or English were unsuccessful, though this is to be expected in light of the Thai 
government‘s lack of transparency.  However, based on the sources available to 
the author at this time, the application of social movement theory — particularly 
that of ―political opportunities‖ as defined by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
(1996) — to this conflict provides useful and much needed insight into the 
trajectory of Malay-Muslim resistance from 1959 until 2008. 
 
Political Opportunities and Formations of Resistance Groups 
The existence of grievances by any given ethnic or religious group do not 
necessarily lead to collective mobilization; rebellion and violence are not 
―natural‖ or inevitable consequences of minority discontent, Muslim or 
otherwise.
9
  However, the existence of grievances provides a necessary 
foundation for collective action.  Several superb publications have focused on 
grievances, including Che Man (1990) on the colonization of Malay-Muslim 
territory by the Thai nation-state, Liow (2005) on the suppression of Islamic 
―pondok‖ school system, and Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu (2006) on economic 
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 See Human Rights Watch 2007, Jitpiromsri and Sobhonvasu 2006, and McCargo 2006 for 
casualty estimates since 2001.  There is no official data on this, however, from the Thai 
government. 
8
 Specific examples of mediating structures, or institutions that open a line of communication 
between local and national leaders and provide a forum for local citizens to express grievances, 
will be detailed in the following section. 
9
 See Schwedler 2001 for an excellent discussion of Muslim identity and mobilization. 
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disparities between the periphery and the center.  As highlighted by all of the 
aforementioned researchers, such grievances have created a lasting situation in 
which ―the Muslims have been under constant pressure from different 
government integration policies… [but have also become] isolated from the 
mainstream of Thai social mobility and… underprivileged minorities.‖10    
However, despite the extensive history of discrimination against and 
repression of Malay-Muslims by the Thai state since the formal annexation of 
their territory in 1902, Malays have not been the only minorities to face poverty, 
military confrontation and the threat of cultural assimilation.  They have, 
however, been the only minority group to sustain armed resistance against the 
Thai state.  Therefore, the application of political opportunity theory should 
account for, at least in part, variation in resistance action.  While the term 
―political opportunity‖ — and equally as important, ―political constraint‖ — 
should be used with care so as not to be overused or applied to any and all 
phenomena, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996a) posit that there is some 
consensus in what constitutes political opportunity.  These dimensions include the 
relative openness or closure of the institutional political system; the stability or 
instability of a broad set of elite alignments that comprise or support a given 
party; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state capacity and propensity 
for repression.  Movements may exploit emerging system weaknesses, but may 
also ―arise in the context of contracting political opportunities,‖ thus making 
opportunities for themselves even while experiencing constraint and threat.
11
   
Questions have been raised in recent literature on the conflict regarding the 
timing and form of collective action.  For example, Jitpriomsri and Sobhonvasu 
remark, 
 
In 2004, violent incidents increased twenty-seven fold compared with the 
average rate of similar incidents during the previous decade.  If identity 
politics—a consciousness of Patani‘s12 glorious ancient kingdom, or the 
sense of Malay ethnic identity—are the main reasons behind the 
operations, the question remains: Why has violence surged now, and not 
earlier?
13
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 Che Man 1990, 42. 
11
 McAdam 1996b, 32; italics added for emphasis. 
12
 Patani is the name of the Malay-Muslim kingdom that fought against the Siamese kingdom 
for autonomy before 1902; this is distinguished from Pattani, which is a modern province in 
the south.  Patani is widely referenced by Malay-Muslims as the historical precedent for a new 
state. 
13
 Jitpriomsri and Sobhonvasu 2006, 115. 
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Looking at grievances based in a collective Malay-Muslim understanding of 
history, or the development of their cultural identity as one that stands inherently 
opposed to Thai-Buddhism, may explain Malay-Muslim resistance to some 
degree.  However, it does not account for violent resistance per se.  While this 
discussion does not assume that policies by the Thai government are the only 
factors influencing the Malay-Muslim resistance movements, government 
policies do directly affect political constraints and opportunities, particularly 
because the Thai government is seen as the primary cause and target of resistance.  
Therefore, government policies and Malay armed resistance will be the focus of 
this discussion. 
 
Dynamics of Contemporary Resistance 
While this analysis begins generally around the year 1960, it should be noted 
that insurgents founded initiator resistance movements against Japanese 
occupation of Thailand in World War II.  They did so expecting to be rewarded 
with irredentism
14
 with the colony of Malaya, then under British control, where 
the majority of Malay-Muslims reside.  One of Thailand‘s most notorious 
dictators, General Phibun,
15
 brutally repressed the rebel groups and outlawed 
many Malay-Muslim cultural practices.  During this time, Malay-Muslims were 
treated as cultural outlaws within the parameters of strict Thai-Buddhist 
nationalism.  Many of the former fighters for irredentism, their appeals ignored 
by the British and the United Nations, organized new resistance organizations 
with the goal of establishing an independent Malay-Muslim state.  Two separatist 
groups emerged during this time: the BNPP
16
 was established in 1959 as an 
armed resistance movement for independence; the BRN
17
, established in 1960, 
was less interested in armed warfare than in strengthening Malay-Muslim 
political leadership through local institutions, such as mosques and schools, or 
―pondoks.‖  Later on, the PULO18 emerged in 1968 with a plan to found a secular 
Malay state, rather than one with an Islamic blueprint as proposed by the BNPP 
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 Irredentism is the desire for annexation of territories administered by another state on the 
grounds of common ethnicity or prior possession, real or perceived. 
15
 Phibun (Thai officials are referred to in practice and in scholarship by their first names) also 
mandated that a Thai family name be necessary to obtain formal employment, and criminalized 
traditional Malay-Muslim clothing, language, and even some religious festivals. Gilquin (2005) 
also writes that security forces often forced Muslims to prostrate before Buddhist objects, 
which was not just a tactic of intimidation and humiliation, but also a forced worshipping of 
idols. 
16
 BNPP stands for the Barisan National Pembebasan Patani. 
17
 BRN stands for the Barisan National of Patani. 
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 PULO stands for the Patani United Liberation Organization; the name is inspired by and 
pays tribute to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO. 
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and the BRN.  The first major phase of insurgent activity, beginning around 1968 
and peaking between 1970 and 1975, was met with a seven-year military 
campaign by the Thai state.  This resulted in hundreds of armed clashes and 
insurgents killed, over 1,200 arrested, about 250 insurgent camps infiltrated, and 
thousands of weapons confiscated.
19
  Despite the aggressive campaign, however, 
separatist organizations continued to operate and to escalate the conflict further; 
increased recruitment into armed resistance factions occurred during this period 
of military occupation.  It has also been postulated that funds were channeled to 
resistance groups from Libya and extended pro-Patani student organizations in 
the Middle East, which may have increased the means and the legitimacy of the 
armed conflict. 
In 1973, Thailand began a three-year democratic transition, though this period 
is also infamous for its civil unrest and harsh military backlash against student 
demonstrators in Bangkok.  However, by 1975 Freedom House ratings showed 
improvements in both political freedom and civil liberties in Thailand.
20
  
However, the military campaign continued in the south.  After five Malay-
Muslim youths were allegedly killed by Thai soldiers in December of 1975, 
thousands demonstrated around the Patani Central Mosque for over one month, 
leading to clashes with security forces, 25 killed and dozens more wounded.  It is 
possible that this demonstration, the largest of its kind until that time, was 
influenced by the belief that the new democratic government would respond to 
public protest.  However, the frustrations of the Malay-Muslim populace went 
unaddressed by the Thai government, which was overwhelmed with its own elite 
fragmentation and general instability.  Che Man (1990) states that separatist 
leaders interpreted the 1975 public revolt as carte blanche popular approval for 
their separatist cause.  Therefore, ―they decided not to devote their relatively 
weak resources to domestic mobilization,‖ and instead focused on gaining 
international support and recognition.
21
  Therefore, violent action decreased to a 
low but ever-present level after 1975. 
The 1980s saw a new direction in the political treatment of the southern issue, 
though it should be stressed that violence on both sides continued intermittently 
throughout the next twenty years.  In an effort to take a different approach to the 
conflict, the new Thai army general assigned to the southern conflict, Chavlit, 
instituted an alternative military strategy, including an amnesty agreement for 
Malay insurgents.  During this time, an estimated 450 separatists accepted the 
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terms of this agreement.  This shifting climate, marked by a more delicate 
handling of the southern issue and fragmentation within some resistance 
organizations, provided an opening for many low-status militants to lay down 
their arms.  This coincided with an organizational restructuring of the BRN, 
which lost some mobilizing momentum during this transition after splitting into 
several factions under the heading, BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C).
22
  
General Prem Tinsulanond also instituted a number of other notable reforms in 
the south during his tenure as Prime Minister (1980-88).  He reversed the 
assimilationist policies of previous administrations by promoting economic 
development and—for the first time—cultural diversity. 23  Prem (originally from 
the southern Songkla province himself, with personal and political ties to the 
region) also established mediating structures with long-term goals.  This initiative 
created the Southern Border Provincial Administration Committee (SBPAC), 
which gave local voices a forum to express their grievances, and provided 
opportunities for collaboration between local elites and federal politicos.  Prem 
also created a special unit of security called the Civilian-Police-Military Task 
Force 43 (CPM 43), which became a ―beacon for ideas of administrative justice, 
symbolizing the Thai state‘s sincerity and goodwill.‖24  The means for Malay-
Muslim leaders to form parties and participate in elections was promoted more 
than ever before by the national government, and Malay-Muslims increased their 
participation in two national political parties, the Democratic (Prem‘s party) and 
New Aspiration parties.  Militants, undermined at this time by such policies, 
formed an umbrella organization, ―Bersatu,‖ with the intention of unifying and 
coordinating goals, actions and resources between the BRN-C, PULO and others. 
Softer policies continued into the beginning of the next decade, including 
extensions of amnesty.  During this time, the armed resistance factions suffered 
from a lack of sustainable revenue, internally and abroad, and the lull in violent 
activity continued.  Signs of preliminary peace agreements emerged when BRN-C 
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 Human Rights Watch claims that the BRN-C has dominated violent action since 2001.  The 
armed wing of the BRN-C, the Patani Freedom Fighters (Pejuang Kemerkdekdaan Pantani) 
supposedly also has links with the RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil), a smaller group often cited 
in the media as responsible for sabotaging infrastructure and murdering civilians.  Because 
neither group claims responsibility for their actions, it is difficult to judge the BRC-C‘s or the 
RKK‘s influence, mobilizing momentum or disruptive power.  
23
 There has never been an official discourse on multinationalism in Thailand, with assimilation 
viewed as a necessary ―solution‖ to the ―problem‖ of minorities.  As Keyes (1987) states, 
―Buddhism was designated as one of the three pillars of Thai nationalism—the others being the 
Thai nation or people and the monarchy‖; the traditions of Malay-Muslims and other 
indigenous minorities ―became suspect both for perpetuating ‗superstitions‘ and for 
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 McCargo 2006, 44. 
Dana Moss 
 
signed an accord with the military in 1992, pledging to change their primary goal 
from independence to autonomy in exchange for a number of provisions.  
However, opportunities for peace agreements were greatly constrained by the 
constant turnover of the Thai political leadership in the following months.  The 
peace accord was declared null and void shortly thereafter because of a leadership 
change; clearly, the government lacked the ability and (and later, the will) to 
implement terms of compromise.  The PULO and BRN-C responded by 
coordinating attacks, some on civilian targets.  In 1997, Thailand experienced 
severe political and economic instability, including a massive financial crisis; 
again, amnesty was offered, and approximately 50 insurgents surrendered.  While 
this chaotic time in Bangkok may have created a brief opening for resistance 
factions to increase violence, the government was undoubtedly too overwhelmed 
to allocate adequate attention or resources to the southern issue.  In either case, 
the BRN-C and PULO were forced to reorganize due to their own elite cleavages 
and lack of resources, and little progress was made.  For the remainder of the 
1990s into the turn of the millennium, the frequency of violent incidents remained 
generally steady but relatively low.
25
 
The structures that Prem had put in place as part of a soft policy in the south, 
with generally effective and long-term preventative goals, were under-appreciated 
until Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) dismantled them during his tumultuous 
tenure as Prime Minster, upsetting a ―carefully negotiated social contract… that 
had ensured relative peace for two decades.‖26  Thaksin broke up Prem‘s power 
network, which managed the southern resistance issue through ―tightly managed 
personal networks,‖27 and replaced Prem‘s army-based network with his own 
police-based network.
28
  He also abolished the SPBAC and CPM 43 in 2002.  
Thaksin claimed that the southern conflict was nothing more than a low-intensity 
spurt of common banditry, which denied not just the resistance as a longstanding 
social movement, but its legacy as a formidable organized force with coordinated 
leadership and the ability to withstand, adapt and disrupt.   
In addition, Thaksin‘s ―War on Drugs‖ had particularly harsh consequences in 
the south.  This hard-line policy gave the police tacit approval ―to target selected 
locals for extrajudicial execution‖ under the guise of a drug war, resulting in 
extrajudicial arrests and murders, even of separatist informers.
29
  For example, in 
October of 2003 in the Narathiwat province, three men disappeared who had been 
former separatists but were protected under the 1981 amnesty.  More than twenty 
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others disappeared between 2002 and 2003.  By March of 2005, locals in 
Narathiwat complained that at least fifty people had disappeared under suspicious 
circumstances.  The abrupt insertion of the Bangkok-based police force into the 
southern region exacerbated ethno-religious tensions, as they were unwilling to 
express sensitivity to local customs and religious etiquette.  Due to the reasons 
stated above, between 2001 and 2003, Thaksin and his allies created ripe 
conditions for an increase in separatist violence.   
The year 2004 saw a series of coordinated attacks by insurgent groups, 
popular protests, and a sharp rise in causalities.  According to one source, the 
number of incidences jumped from 84 in 2003 to 1,843 in just one year.
30
  In 
January of 2004, a series of coordinated attacks on an army depot in Narathiwat 
resulted in one or more insurgent groups obtaining hundreds of weapons and 
killing several Thai officers; 20 government schools were also burned.  This 
resulted in Thaksin‘s declaration of martial law, which gave the police and 
military more power to treat the populace harshly without regard for civil rights.  
Another major incident took place at the Kru-Ze mosque, in which the army 
stormed the building, killing thirty-two men who had barricaded themselves 
inside.  As Liow (2005) comments, ―The sight of bloodstained floors and holy 
books in the … Mosque no doubt resonated with the Muslim population in the 
south and further fed resentment.‖31  In addition, a number of extrajudicial 
killings were recorded that year, including an incident at Saba Yoi market, in 
which fifteen suspected insurgents were found with gunshot wounds in the back 
of the head.  Similar reports and rumors have circulated frequently since then in 
the Thai media.   
In October of 2004, the infamous Tak Bai incident occurred, in which protests 
outside of a police station in Narathiwat resulted in the shooting of several 
protestors and the arrests of over a thousand men.  The stacking of bound 
prisoners in trucks led to the fatal suffocation of seventy-eight Malay-Muslim 
protestors during their transport to a military prison.  This incident attracted 
strong criticism from neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia and international 
media attention.  In the aftermath of Tak Bai, several prominent Muslims sent a 
request to King Bhumibol asking him to assist with the situation; the King 
himself had already warned Thaksin twice in 2004 to handle the southern conflict 
with care.  Thaksin generally disregarded the King‘s requests, and viewed his 
landslide re-election in 2005 as a mandate to continue his hawkish approaches.  
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After receiving increased public criticism for his handling of the south, 
particularly from Prem, Thaksin created a National Reconciliation Council, but 
limited its power and ability to produce reports that might criticize his policies.  
As McCargo states, ―national-level tensions between the competing networks of 
Thaksin and the palace [allied with Prem] provided a context and background for 
the renewed southern violence, creating a space in which other forces could 
emerge and operate.‖32   
It was reported by several media sources in late 2006 that insurgent 
representatives from five different groups had met in secret over the past year 
with top Thai security officials in Langkawi, Malaysia, to develop a peace plan.
33
  
This conference, mediated by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed, proposed to re-establish the SBPAC, promote economic development 
in the region, recognize Malay-Muslims as a separate ethnic entity, and establish 
Patani-Malay as the official language of the region.  Other stipulations called for 
the establishment of an independent tribunal to hold army officers accountable for 
human rights violations and to install another amnesty plan.  However, these talks 
were indefinitely stalled over provisions of accountability and amnesty, and the 
government at the time denied any involvement with such talks.  Not surprisingly, 
the momentum of violence was sustained at peaked levels. 
Despite the bloodless coup that overthrew Thaksin in September of 2006, 
violence continued with assassinations and the targeting of any person or 
structure perceived as being aligned with the state.  This has included the 
beheadings of Buddhist monks, the murdering of teachers, and the bombings of 
local institutions.  It appeared that Thaksin‘s approaches in the south, at the very 
least, reinvigorated a full-force renewal of violence by the militant factions of the 
PULO, BRN-C and BRN, accompanied by a surge in terrorist tactics with long-
term implications and sustainability.  The interim Prime Minister, Surayud 
Chulanont, attempted to reverse the government‘s approach to the south by 
making an unprecedented public apology over the handling of the Tak Bai 
incident and dismissing charges against any remaining detainees.  While the 
media reported that many families of the Tak Bai victims and Muslim leaders felt 
that the apology was genuine, the violence continued unabated.
34
  Surayud did 
institute some parts of the Langkawi plan, such as the reopening of the SBPAC; 
however, there has been no further discussion regarding an amnesty or provisions 
for accountability. 
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With the restoration of the democratic process, the People‘s Power Party 
(PPP), closely allied with Thaksin‘s banned Thai Rak Thai party, won the 
majority of seats in the August, 2007 election, and appointed Samak Sundaravej 
as the Prime Minister in January, 2008.  Debates about how to handle the 
southern issue created controversy and became enveloped in the new 
government‘s struggle to assert its authority.  Samak made controversial public 
statements about the conflict, claiming that Malay-Muslim grievances over 
―injustice will never bring an end to the story.  We have to say [that] the 
[injustice] issue is over, period.‖  This tone reiterated Thaksin‘s denial of 
legitimate Malay grievances.  It was also reported that Samak ―expected ‗the 
wound to be healed in three or four years‘‖ without citing reasons as to why or 
how the conflict would be resolved without addressing issues of injustice.
35
   
It was reported that Interior Minister Chalerm Yubamrung proposed a public 
hearing on a proposal to give the southernmost provinces a form of autonomy, but 
Samak distanced himself from the idea, stating that ―it is just Mr. Chalerm‘s 
idea… He should not talk about it in public.‖36  It was stated in other reports 
while some form of autonomy would be considered, the issue of full 
independence was being dropped once again.
37
  Shortly thereafter, Chalerm was 
quoted in the media as having fully dropped the autonomy proposal for the south 
in order to avoid ―creating disunity in the society,‖ despite the obvious reality.38  
This prompted a rare response from PULO leader Lukman Lima, currently 
residing in exile in Sweden, who stated that ―the worst-case scenario can still be 
avoided, but only if Mr. Samak and the military forces allow the people of Pattani 
to determine their own future… If, in a referendum sanctioned by Bangkok, 
Pattani chooses independence, there will be one less border in the world marked 
by endemic conflict.‖39  However, such a referendum is unlikely to be approved 
by the current government, which is self-consciously avoiding ―soft‖ policy.   
Samak‘s PPP party was ousted after a series of controversial court rulings in 
September, 2008.  The government has had three prime ministers since 2008 and 
March of 2009, and the ensuing disruptions have diverted attention away from the 
southern insurgency.  The Thai government‘s current indecision and lack of a 
clear or alternative policy on the conflict has resulted in the continuation of 
Thaksin‘s hard policies, including martial law in the region and the presence of 
over 40,000 security personnel.  
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Discussion 
The fact that ―insurgents can be expected to mobilize in response to and in a 
manner consistent with the very specific changes that grant them more leverage‖ 
allows for the examination of violent resistance in light of government policies.
40
  
While all of the motivating factors contributing to insurgent violence cannot be 
accounted for, an analysis of political opportunities and resistance action is an 
important and essential step.  As the discussion of contemporary dynamics has 
shown, hard policies since World War II, despite their potentially constraining 
effects on resistance action, have been consistently met with an increase in 
violent resistance.  The Thai government‘s policies and corresponding levels of 
Malay-Muslim violent resistance are documented in Figure 1.  The symbols (+), 
(++) and (-) are used to signify periods of sustained violence, increased violence, 
or decreased violence (respectively) by Malay-Muslim separatist groups 
collectively.
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Figure 1: Violent Resistance and Policies, 1959-2008 
 
Phase  Central Government Movement Action 
  Policy on Southern 
  Resistance           
 
1959-69 Hard policy:  BNPP, BRN, PULO groups formed for separatist state 
Military campaign Guerrilla action initiated against military and  
cultural assimilation  infrastructure (+)  
 
1970-75 Hard policy:  Armed campaigns rises to highest level since inception of 
7-year full-scale groups (++) 
war 
 
1975-79 Hard policy:   Resources drained: seek international support & funds; 
Cont. military   Decreased violence but sustained at lower levels; Popular  
  presence  uprisings, police brutality sustain separatist cause (+) 
 
1980-93 Soft policy:  Hundreds accept amnesty 
  Economic develop. Malays increase participation in allied political parties 
  Cultural diversity New organization Bersatu formed to coordinate activities 
  Mediating structures BRN-C agrees to peace accord with military  
  Amnesty  Low levels of violence, sporadic (-) 
 
1994-96 Hard policy:  Increased violence in direct response to broken peace 
  Peace accord  agreement; groups take advantage of Thai gov‘t  
  declared void  instability (+) 
  Gov‘t ―cracks down‖   
 
1997-00 Hard & soft policy: Few accept amnesty 
  Amnesty offered Violent activity remains frequent (+) 
  Con‘t punitiveness 
 
2001-06 Hard policy:  Violence increases against increased military presence  
  War on Drugs  Infrastructure and development projects targeted 
  Denial of grievances Any person seen as allied with the Thai state is targeted  
  Mediating structures (++) 
  dismantled 
  Martial law 
  Protestors killed 
  Economic develop. 
 
2006-08 Hard Policy  Violence sustained; terrorist tactics sustained (++)  
  State of emergency 
  Martial law retained 
  SBPAC reopened
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Several correlations between hard and soft policy and levels of violent 
resistance action are noted here.  The first is that levels of violent resistance 
decreased under two general circumstances.  The first occurred when soft 
policies, including offers of amnesty, were implemented.  It should also be 
noted that insurgents have taken advantage of amnesty each and every time 
it has been offered, though with varying degrees of success.  The second 
condition has occurred when key resistance groups implemented a conscious 
change in strategy, usually in an effort to consolidate limited resources, and 
experienced fragmentation/reorganization.   
On the other hand, constraining forces, including military intervention 
and a decrease in civil liberties, have had a mobilizing effect on violent 
resistance.  In fact, violence has increased and/or been sustained without 
exception during phases of hard policy, suggesting that such constraints only 
revamp the perceived need and legitimacy among Malays for armed 
resistance.  Clearly, all groups, despite their ideological differences, see 
violent recourse as a logical reaction during phases of increased 
military/policy occupation and decreased civil rights.   
Anecdotal evidence of this process has been highlighted in some Thai 
news outlets with interviews of former insurgents. One such interviewee was 
a former PULO leader named Yusouf Longpi, who resided in retirement as 
of 2002.
41
  He stated that a major motivating factor in his decision to take up 
arms for independence was the abusive nature of policing in his community 
and his persecution for non-violent resistance.  Yusouf received a secular 
education abroad in Pakistan with a degree in public administration, and 
returned to teach in a local school with many of his peers.  This new 
generation of educated Malays, he said, ―were determined to make changes.‖  
He began his resistance work by organizing local demonstrations for 
improved civil rights, but his work was deemed ―pro-separatist,‖ even 
though his focus at that time was not about succession.  Yusouf was put on a 
blacklist by the Thai government, an action he perceived as a death-
sentence, as many other blacklisted colleagues disappeared during this 
time.
42
  He responded by fleeing to Malaysia and then returned eventually to 
lead a PULO unit.  Yusouf stated that only government positions were 
                                                 
41
 The Nation, April 3, 2002.   
42
 The admitted existence of blacklists was reported in The Nation, April 26, 2006, which 
reported that ―General Sonthi went as far as saying that the way individuals came to be 
listed was questionable and personal grudges might be the underlying motive... Reports 
about the lists surfaced in mid-2004 with each security agency, including the military and 
police, believed to have prepared its own version. The people on these lists were said to 
be targets of manhunts or summary executions by rogue officials.‖ 
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attacked under his command, and never civilians; he later surrendered under 
the amnesty program of 1991 during the post-Prem lull in violence.  This 
story exemplifies how armed mobilization became a logical recourse after 
the suppression of peaceful protest; it also illustrates how an amnesty 
arrangement swayed the commitment to armed resistance during a period of 
improved relations between the central government and the Malay-Muslims. 
Interestingly, the correlation between hard policies and violent resistance 
remains strong despite the status of democracy in the central government 
(whether that status be restored democracy, transitioning from dictatorship 
to democracy, or dictatorship outright).  Therefore, the relative openness or 
closure of the federal institutional political system has had virtually no effect 
on levels of violent resistance.  What does matter is the presence of local 
mediating structures, which provide an open and relatively trusted line of 
communication between central and peripheral powers.  The existence of 
effective local mediating structures also appears to have a greater negative 
impact on violence than the increased participation of Malay-Muslims in 
elected governance.  As McAdam, McCarthy and Zald argue,   
 
The successful use of ‗proper channels‘ would seem to depend upon 
control over precisely the kinds of conventional political resources—
money, votes, influence with prominent others—that movement 
groups tend to lack.  Lacking such resources, movements may have 
little choice but to use their ability to disrupt public order as a 
negative inducement to bargaining.
43
   
 
In addition to a lack of political resources, fragmentation between elected 
Malay-Muslims in government and armed resistance factions is likely for 
several reasons.  These reasons include the perceived corruption of political 
structures, the ineffectiveness of local and federal factions to devise and 
implement solutions on the southern issue, and the inability for Malay-
Muslims to work with separatists while operating within the Thai 
government.  Though it has also been documented that many Malay-
Muslims have little or no faith in the candidates of alternative parties, they 
did vote overwhelmingly against Thaksin‘s Thai Rak Thai party in 2005.44  
However, Malay-Muslim participation in voting is condemned by at least 
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 McAdam McCarthy and Zald 1996a, 14. Italics added for emphasis. 
44
 Tan-Mullins 2006, 147. 
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one separatist group, as exemplified by the bombing of a polling location in 
March, 2008.
45
   
There is also evidence that militants condemn negotiating with the Thai 
government.  As one member of the BRN-C reported to Human Rights 
Watch, ―…the cause of our fight cannot, and will not, be compromised 
through any negotiations or any deals with the Thai state… We have learned 
from the past that negotiations would weaken our movement by making our 
members subject to compromise, cooptation and bribery.‖46  On the other 
hand, some interviewed militants have expressed willingness to participate 
in negotiations and international mediation.  For example, the Bangkok Post 
reported that a mediation meeting might have taken place in Geneva in the 
spring of 2008, possibly with the PULO and the BNPP.
47
  However, the Thai 
government has not officially recognized these talks, nor have they been 
willing to discuss these negotiations in the media.   
Despite the significant split in resistance leaders‘ views on negotiation 
and reconciliation, the fact that some resistance factions may be willing to 
compromise on issues of full separatism by agreeing instead to an 
autonomous status is a promising development.  In fact, moderate groups 
may benefit from what McAdam, McCarthy and Zald dub the ―radical flank 
effect,‖ which describes ―one effect that often follows from the presence of 
‗extremist‘ groups within the same movement as other more ‗moderate‘ 
[social movement organizations]… In effect, the presence of extremists 
encourages funding support for the moderates as a way of undercutting the 
influence of the radicals.‖48  However, in order for the moderate factions to 
work productively with the government, the central authority must first be at 
least willing to discern between terrorist insurgents, moderate separatists 
who might be willing to accept amnesty protection, and ordinary citizens 
who have no direct links to the terrorist insurgency.   
In addition, the government must express willingness to compromise on 
more than just the reinstating of Prem‘s mediating structures (the SBPAC 
and CPM 43).  In a state-of-emergency climate, in which basic civil rights 
are suspended in the name of fighting terrorism, constraints on public dissent 
have increased.  Therefore, citizens are less likely to put themselves at risk 
by reporting grievances to the SBPAC; in addition, the social networks that 
the SBPAC and CPM 43 relied on in the past were severely disrupted during 
                                                 
45
  Violence at a polling office was noted in Pathan and Harai, Bangkok Post, April 21, 
2008.  No group claimed responsibility for this action. 
46
 Human Rights Watch 2007, 44. 
47
 Bangkok Post, May 19, 2008. 
48
 McAdam McCathy and Zald 1996a, 14. 
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Thaksin‘s term as Prime Minister.  It cannot be expected that these 
mediating structures will operate with the same level of effectiveness during 
periods of escalated violence as they did during periods of relative peace.  
However, the historical correlation between hard policy and increased 
violent resistance highlights the critical need for soft, sustainable policy 
alternatives.  These policies would need to — at the very minimum — 
provide Malay-Muslim citizens with legitimate outlets for grievances, 
dissent and input, offer an amnesty, and implement provisions for 
accountability and civil rights.   
There are several related issues that should be explored in future 
research.  The first is the recent transition by resistance groups from guerrilla 
warfare, primarily targeting security personnel and infrastructure, to terrorist 
tactics.  This has coincided with the increased proliferation of a ―radical 
Islamist ideology‖ since 2004.49  Another topic of urgent importance for 
future study is that of popular support for the separatist movement, since 
popular approval of insurgent action cannot be assumed.  The number of 
Muslim casualties has rivaled those of Buddhists since 2001, which is a 
striking feature of the new tactic.  Any Malay-Muslim who does not 
explicitly condone the insurgent cause and methodology puts him or herself 
at risk for attack.
 50
  Since local religious leaders, unarmed civilians, women, 
children, and students have been targeted and murdered, it is extremely 
likely that popular support for armed resistance has shifted.  According to 
one ethnographer, the anonymity of such attacks has also ―caused intense 
confusion and frustration‖ in the general Malay-Muslim populace.51   
It is suggested that future research also analyze how and why the 
dominant mobilizing ideology has shifted to a fundamentalist framework — 
one that justifies any and all violent action in pursuit of a righteous goal — 
and how this relates to political opportunities.  If popular support for 
separatist violence has decreased due to the frequent and indiscriminate 
killings of local Muslims and the sabotage of local infrastructure, support for 
a moderate position will likely increase.
52
  This could potentially provide a 
viable opening for moderate voices on both sides to propose new 
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 Sugunnasil 2006, 119.  We take ―terrorism‖ to mean ―organized violence against 
civilians in pursuit of a political objective‖ (Hassan 2007, 2). 
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compromises and solutions.  However, if this moderate voice is silenced by 
the separatists and either ignored or persecuted by the state, hard-line 
reactionary policies from the government will continue to be met with 
violent resistance — as the findings of this study submit — and will 
predictably propel this crisis into yet another decade. 
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